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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from a judgment of 
conviction and sentence that the District Court entered against the appellant Shawn Davis 
on June 21, 2011, following his conviction at a jury trial of conspiracy to possess a 
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firearm by a previously convicted felon and/or conspiracy to possess a stolen firearm, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  After the jury returned its verdict, Davis moved for a 
judgment of acquittal but the District Court denied his motion.  On this appeal Davis 
challenges his conviction, asserting that the evidence at the trial was insufficient to allow 
the jury to convict him.  For the reasons we set forth below, we agree with Davis and will 
reverse his conviction and remand the case to the District Court to enter a judgment of 
acquittal.   
The evidence at the trial viewed in the light most favorably to the government as 
the verdict winner, see United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 2008), 
revealed the following events.  On June 14, 2009, at approximately 2:00 a.m., 
Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Sean Taylor and Trooper Rodney Fink, in the course 
of conducting a roving driver under the influence traffic check, stopped an automobile 
that Davis was driving and owned that was traveling west on Walnut Bottom Road just 
before Route 465 near Carlisle, Pennsylvania.  The troopers stopped the automobile 
because it crossed the line dividing the lanes of traffic.  Delontay Barnes was seated in 
the front passenger seat and Eric Seigler was seated in the rear passenger-side seat.  
When Corporal Taylor approached the vehicle, he noticed that Davis had a switchblade 
knife on his lap.  Corporal Taylor then directed Davis to exit the vehicle and, after Davis 
did so, Taylor placed Davis in handcuffs, and directed him to stand at the rear of the 
vehicle.   
As Corporal Taylor removed Barnes and Seigler from the car, he saw a 9mm 
pistol protruding from a yellow, semi-translucent plastic shopping bag on the seat or 
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console between Davis and Barnes.  He also saw a .38 special revolver on the floor of the 
rear passenger side where Seigler had been seated.  Corporal Taylor secured the weapons, 
read the three men their Miranda rights, and placed them under arrest.  At that time all 
three occupants of the vehicle admitted to having been convicted of felonies but they all 
denied that they owned the firearms and denied knowing that the guns were in the 
vehicle.   
Subsequently, Corporal Taylor asked the men where they were going, and Seigler 
responded that they were driving to Plainfield, Pennsylvania to see a girl.  Corporal 
Taylor responded that the men were driving in the opposite direction from Plainfield1
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed the initial criminal complaint arising 
from this incident, charging Davis with offenses under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code 
and the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.  On March 4, 2010, however, a grand jury in 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania returned a multi-count indictment against Davis, 
Barnes, and Seigler that superseded the state charges.  In relevant part, Count I charged 
the three defendants with conspiracy to possess a firearm by a previously-convicted felon 
and/or to possess a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(g)(1), and 922(j), 
 and 
asked for the girl’s name and number to verify Seigler’s claim.  In response, Seigler 
stated that he had nothing further to say.     
                                              
1The parties dispute whether the direction in which Davis and his companions were 
traveling was actually away from Plainfield or, as Davis asserts, was an indirect route to 
the same place.  We note that the men were heading essentially in a southwesterly 
direction on Walnut Bottom Road and Plainfield was north of their location when the 
Troopers stopped them.   
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Count II charged the three defendants with possession of a firearm by a previously-
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and Count V charged the 
defendants with possession of a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).2
 On June 4, 2010, Davis filed a motion to suppress evidence seeking to exclude all 
evidence seized from the vehicle, predicating the motion on an assertion that the evidence 
had been seized in an illegal search.  The District Court, however, denied the motion and 
Davis does not challenge that disposition on this appeal.  Thereafter, Davis on January 6, 
2011, filed a motion in limine to prohibit the introduction of certain evidence seized from 
the vehicle as unfairly prejudicial and irrelevant.  That evidence consisted of a night 
vision scope, three pairs of black gloves, four handkerchiefs, a gray wool knit cap, a 
digital camera, binoculars, three dark hooded sweatshirts, a flashlight, and two two-way 
radio devices.  The Court granted the motion and excluded the listed evidence from trial.   
  
Davis entered a plea of not guilty but Barnes and Seigler pled guilty to Count II, 
possession of a firearm by a previously-convicted felon.   
 At the trial, the government and Davis stipulated that Davis, Barnes, and Seigler 
were all previously-convicted felons and that these convictions prohibited them from 
possessing any firearms or ammunition.  They stipulated as well that the guns retrieved 
from Davis’s vehicle were firearms as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3), that the firearms 
had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
                                              
2The parties’ briefs do not specify what other offenses the indictment charged or how 
those charges were resolved and the parties have not included the indictment in the 
appendix.  We have not found it necessary to ascertain the disposition of those charges to 
adjudicate this appeal.   
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§ 922(g), and that both firearms had been stolen as that act is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 
922(j).  At trial, Corporal Taylor and Trooper Fink both testified, and they provided the 
factual account of the incident that we recited above.   
 After the troopers testified, Davis’s girlfriend, Alyssa Statler, and Barnes and 
Seigler, all of whom Davis called as witnesses, testified.  Statler recounted that she had 
discovered that she was pregnant on June 13, 2009, and that she and Davis made plans 
for Davis to visit her house that night after he got off from work around 1:30 in the 
morning.  Statler stated that Davis called her from work and told her that he was going to 
give his friends a ride after he left work but that he would go to her house afterwards.   
Seigler testified that he asked Davis to give him a ride to a friend’s house in 
Newville, Pennsylvania3
                                              
3Corporal Taylor testified that Seigler said that his friend’s house was in Plainfield but 
Seigler testified at trial that he told Corporal Taylor that his friend’s house was in 
Newville.  We note that Newville and Plainfield are adjacent towns, with Newville 
situated approximately 6.3 miles southwest of Plainfield.  Although the government in its 
brief makes it clear that it thinks otherwise, this minor discrepancy does not seem to us to 
be particularly significant.  In any event, the discrepancy does not somehow overcome 
the insufficiency of the government’s proof.   
 after Davis got off work.  Seigler testified that the purpose of 
the ride was to take him to his friend’s house so that he could drop off his .38 revolver 
there but he did not testify that Davis knew that he had that objective.  He stated that he 
was carrying the revolver in the waistband of his pants when he entered Davis’s vehicle 
and that the gun was not visible to Davis because his shirt covered it.  Seigler testified 
that once he realized the vehicle was being pulled over, he put the .38 revolver on the 
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floor of the car.  Seigler also testified that he did not tell Davis he was carrying a gun and 
that there was no conversation in the vehicle regarding his gun.  
 Barnes testified that Davis agreed to pick up Seigler and him and go to a girl’s 
house.  Barnes also testified that when he entered Davis’s vehicle he, Barnes, was 
carrying the 9mm pistol in the waistband of his pants, probably with his shirt pulled over 
it, and that he placed it in the yellow bag once he saw the emergency lights activated on 
the troopers’ car behind them.  Barnes testified that he did not tell Davis that he had a gun 
in his possession, did not show Davis his gun, there was no conversation in the vehicle 
regarding his gun, and, to the best of Barnes’s knowledge, Davis did not know Barnes 
had brought a gun into his car. 
At the close of the government’s case, Davis made an unsuccessful oral motion for 
a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a), and at the 
conclusion of his case, Davis unsuccessfully renewed that motion.  On January 11, 2011, 
the jury returned a verdict convicting Davis on Count I, conspiracy to possess a firearm 
by a previously-convicted felon and/or to possess a stolen firearm, but it acquitted Davis 
on Counts II and V.4
                                              
4The District Court gave the jury a verdict slip charging conspiracy to possess a firearm 
by a previously-convicted felon and/or to possess a stolen firearm.  In these 
circumstances, we will uphold the jury’s verdict so long as there is sufficient evidence to 
support either one of these charges.  See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49, 112 
S.Ct. 466, 469 (1991).   
  After the District Court dismissed the jury, Davis made an oral 
motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count I pursuant to Rule 29(b).  The parties 
submitted briefs on that motion, and on April 6, 2011, the Court denied the motion, and 
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sentenced Davis to a 55-month custodial term to be followed by a three-year term of 
supervised release.  Davis then appealed.   
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
jurisdiction to review the conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We make a de novo review 
of the order denying the Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal.  See United States v. 
Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 476-77 
(3d Cir. 2002).  In considering such a motion, we “‘review the record in the light more 
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 
found proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available evidence.’”  Bobb, 471 
F.3d at 494.  “[W]e must sustain the verdict ‘if a rational trier of fact could have found 
[the] defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the verdict is supported by 
substantial evidence.’”  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quoting United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995)).  We draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict and will find that the evidence was 
insufficient only where the prosecution’s failure of proof is clear.  Smith, 294 F.3d at 
476-77.  In making our review, we “must be ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the role of the 
jury by weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or by substituting [our] 
judgment for that of the jury.”  United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 “[T]o sustain a conviction under [18 U.S.C.] § 371, the government must show: 
(1) the existence of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant’s 
knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy; and (3) the commission of an 
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.”  United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 206 (3d 
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Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bobb, 471 
F.3d at 494 (“The essential elements of conspiracy are (1) a shared unity of purpose, (2) 
an intent to achieve a common goal, and (3) an agreement to work together toward the 
goal.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “The government must proffer 
evidence that [the defendant] knew of the agreement and intended both to join it and 
accomplish its illegal objects.”  McKee, 506 F.3d at 241.  “The government must 
establish each element beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 
476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“The elements of a conspiracy may be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence, 
but each element of the offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Idowu, 157 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 
1998) (same). 
 A conspiratorial agreement may be explicit or implicit.  McKee, 506 F.3d at 238.  
Thus, the government need not present direct evidence of the agreement.  Therefore, the 
existence of “a conspiratorial agreement can be proven circumstantially based upon 
reasonable inferences drawn from actions and statements of the conspirators or from the 
circumstances surrounding the scheme.”  Id.  Indeed, “[t]he prosecution may bear [its] 
burden entirely through circumstantial evidence.”  Bobb, 471 F.3d at 494; see also 
Brodie, 402 F.3d at 134 (same). 
Nevertheless, “[w]hen a conspiracy conviction is at issue, we must closely 
scrutinize the sufficiency of the evidence.”  United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192, 206 
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Schramm, 75 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1996) 
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(“‘[T]he sufficiency of the evidence in a conspiracy prosecution requires close scrutiny.’” 
(quoting United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987)))).  This close 
scrutiny is necessary because although a conspiracy charge requires consideration of 
whether there is evidence of an alleged agreement between two or more persons, “a 
defendant’s guilt must always remain ‘individual and personal.’”  Tyson, 653 F.3d at 206 
(quoting Boria, 592 F.3d at 480).   
 The government acknowledges that, as is not unusual in conspiracy prosecutions, 
it did not offer direct evidence that there was a conspiracy among the alleged conspirators 
to commit the offense or offenses that were the object of the alleged conspiracy, here the 
unlawful possession of one or both of the firearms the troopers seized from Davis’s 
vehicle.  Instead, the government contends that what it regards as unusual circumstances 
surrounding the night of Davis’s arrest sufficiently support Davis’s conviction because 
they typically would not arise by coincidence.  The facts to which the government points 
are that Davis agreed to provide Barnes and Seigler with a car ride despite Davis’s 
girlfriend’s recent discovery that she was pregnant, the men were in a vehicle together on 
a rural road at 2:00 in the morning, Davis had a switchblade knife on his lap, and the 
three men were in close proximity to the firearms when the troopers stopped them.  
Moreover, all three men denied ownership of the handguns and Seigler provided what the 
government believes was an implausible explanation regarding the men’s destination.5
                                              
5The government also contends that the jury was entitled to disregard any potentially 
exculpatory testimony from Barnes and Seigler regarding Davis’s lack of knowledge of 
their possession of handguns.  We agree that the jury was entitled to determine Barnes’s 
and Seigler’s credibility and assign the quantum of weight to their testimony that it 
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The District Court agreed with the government and concluded that “the totality of the 
circumstantial evidence . . . suggesting an agreement to actually or constructively possess 
and deliver a firearm at 2:00 a.m., when [Davis] had ostensibly more important 
engagements to attend, is more than adequate for a rational jury to conclude that ‘at least 
a tacit agreement’ existed [among Davis, Barnes, and Seigler] based on the variety of 
unusual acts performed by members of the conspiracy.”  App. at 24.   
By characterizing the circumstances of June 14 as “unusual,” the government 
essentially attempts to align this case with United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473.  In 
Smith, five local police officers were charged with forming a criminal conspiracy to 
violate Earl Faison’s civil rights when the officers arrested him and then beat him to 
death under the belief that he was responsible for another officer’s death.6
                                                                                                                                                  
deemed appropriate.  Thus, we do not disturb the jury’s verdict on the basis that we 
accept Barnes’s and Seigler’s testimony as true and, indeed, we neither accept nor reject 
their testimony.  The lack of any testimony supporting the government’s case, however, 
is a relevant consideration.   
  A jury 
convicted the officers but the district court granted their motion for an acquittal.  On the 
government’s appeal we reversed as we concluded that testimony that the officers 
together deviated from their department’s standard operating procedure governing 
apprehension and interrogation of criminal suspects was sufficient to support the jury’s 
verdict.  That testimony showed that it was unusual for ten officers to accompany a 
suspect to the station as they did following Faison’s arrest, the officers contravened a 
    
6 That belief was mistaken but even if it had been correct the evidence in that case would 
have supported the convictions.  The police are no more justified in beating a guilty 
prisoner to death than an innocent prisoner. 
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directive to take suspects to the County Prosecutor’s Office and instead took Faison to the 
jail, the officers brought Faison into the jail through a different entrance than the entrance 
designated for the drop off of prisoners, and, contrary to routine practice, Faison was 
never taken to the booking room, fingerprinted, photographed, or given the opportunity to 
wash his face to remove the pepper spray the officers had used on him.  Id. at 476, 478.  
Furthermore, there was evidence that certain of the officers submitted consistent but false 
reports regarding the circumstances of Faison’s arrest.  Id. at 478.  We explained that 
“[t]he fact that a group of people, arguably with a common goal — that of punishing [the 
fallen officer’s] murderer — engaged as a group in so many unusual acts could certainly 
lead a reasonable juror to the conclusion that there was at least a tacit agreement between 
the officers . . . .”  Id.   
Recently, in United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192, a case we find instructive here, 
we reviewed the boundaries of Smith.  In Tyson, Shawn Tyson transported firearms 
illegally between Tennessee and the Virgin Islands and was charged with conspiracy to 
transport firearms, among other crimes.  The government argued that the “unusual” 
activities of Tyson and his alleged co-conspirator, Kelroy Morrell, provided sufficient 
evidence to support the conspiracy conviction.  Id. at 208-09.  In this regard, the 
government pointed to the facts that Tyson and Morrell flew together from the Virgin 
Islands to Tennessee, and that Morrell stayed with Tyson in Tyson’s Tennessee residence 
for one week, during which time Tyson purchased 14 firearms.  Id.  During a police 
search that week in Tennessee officers found Tyson and Morrell sitting in Tyson’s home 
with a pistol in plain view of the men and more guns in plain view in a bedroom.  Id. at 
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196.  Later, Tyson and Morrell traveled back to the Virgin Islands together, and both 
checked luggage containing firearms.  Id.  Neither man registered the firearms when they 
arrived in the Virgin Islands as required by law.  When Tyson made another trip to the 
Virgin Islands, Morrell picked him up at the airport and they placed Tyson’s luggage 
containing numerous firearms and ammunition in the trunk of Morrell’s vehicle.  Id. at 
197.   
 We found the evidence insufficient to convict Tyson of conspiracy to transport 
firearms and thus upheld the district court’s order granting Tyson an acquittal on this 
count of the indictment after his conviction at a jury trial.  We stated that “[b]y 
characterizing the activities of Tyson and Morrell as ‘unusual,’ the government attempts 
to cast a pall of suspicion over their week-long interaction[,] [b]ut applying labels is 
insufficient . . . [and] [u]nfortunately, the government makes little attempt to explain 
what is so ‘unusual’ about the conduct at issue.”  Id. at 209.  In this regard, we noted that 
the government could not identify “some baseline norm” from which the defendants 
deviated and “[a]lmost all of the facts highlighted by the government focus upon lawful 
conduct.”  Id.  We found further that the government failed to demonstrate that Tyson 
and Morrell engaged in “coordinated action in support of a common goal” because “[t]o 
constitute coordinated action, there must be some link between the co-conspirators’ 
conduct that suggests integration or unity of purpose.”  Id. at 210 (citations omitted).  We 
concluded that the facts at most demonstrated “proof of parallel conduct” but did not 
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evince “a link between the two men” nor did it show “that one is facilitating the 
handiwork of the other.”  Id.7
In Smith, there was ample evidence that the police officers shared a common goal 
and together deviated from established procedure numerous times in the course of 
Faison’s arrest and treatment.  In our case, however, as in Tyson, the government 
attempts to ascribe the same moniker of unusualness to a set of far less extraordinary 
facts.  The government’s attempt to label as suspicious the timing of the 2:00 a.m. drive 
and the fact that Davis, Barnes, and Seigler were traveling on a rural road is 
unconvincing, particularly in light of the fact that there was evidence that Davis’s work 
shift ended at 1:30 a.m.  Further, Davis’s agreement to provide Barnes and Seigler with 
rides notwithstanding his girlfriend’s revelation that she was pregnant, though arguably 
insensitive,
   
8
                                              
7 There were numerous additional charges in Tyson but we need not discuss their 
disposition. 
 does not come close to the level of unusual joint conduct that we found 
supported the conspiracy conviction in Smith.  We acknowledge that the circumstances 
that Davis had a switchblade on his person and that the three men were “in close 
proximity to loaded handguns” when the troopers stopped them is certainly suspicious.  
Nevertheless, these facts — while unusual — are not sufficient to show that Davis, 
 
8 Judges must be careful not to assume that their own social values are the norm and then 
render decisions merely because people who have different values have somehow 
deviated from what the judges regard as an appropriate standard of conduct.  Exercising 
that restraint, we will not say that even though we cannot be certain as to why Barnes and 
Seigler were in Davis’s car or where the three men were going when the troopers stopped 
them, Davis’s conduct in taking his friends somewhere before he visited his pregnant 
girlfriend was somehow inappropriate. 
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Barnes, and Seigler or Davis and one of the two other men, engaged in coordinated action 
in support of the allegedly common goal of possessing the firearms.   
 In an attempt to bolster its case, the government puts forth two specific theories 
upon which it bases its contention that the jury could have found the existence of a 
conspiratorial agreement.  First, the government contends that the timing and location of 
the stop of the vehicle and the fact that each occupant was in close proximity to one of 
the firearms or a knife gives rise to a reasonable inference that the occupants intended to 
engage in some type of illegal activity that involved possessing the guns.  Second, the 
government contends that if the jury believed Seigler’s testimony that Davis was giving 
Barnes and Seigler a ride so that Seigler could drop off his gun at his friend’s house, it 
could have inferred that Davis knew of the purpose of the ride.  Based on that inference, 
the government contends that the jury could have drawn the further inference that Davis 
conspired with Seigler to possess the gun by knowingly giving him a ride to the girl’s 
house to drop it off. 
The government’s first theory goes well beyond the evidence actually presented in 
this case and depends on unbridled speculation.  See Boria, 592 F.3d at 481 (“[O]ur 
conspiracy case law forbids the upholding of a conviction on the basis of . . . 
speculation.”)  (quoting United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1997)).  A 
conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn 
from such proof, but those inferences “must have a logical and convincing connection to 
the facts established.”  Boria, 592 F.3d at 481 (emphasis added); see also United States v. 
Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 684 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The law . . . requires that the inferences 
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drawn . . . have a logical and convincing connection to the facts established.”) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Though it is entirely possible that the men 
intended to engage in illegal activity when the troopers stopped them, it would require 
undue speculation to infer from the handful of facts established at trial that they had that 
intent.  However, even if such an inference could be drawn, there simply would be no 
plausible connection between that inference and the further inference that the men also 
conspired to possess one or both of the firearms.9
The government’s second theory has a stronger foundation but still is inadequate 
to support the conviction.  Seigler testified that the purpose of the ride was to drop off his 
gun at his friend’s house, and the jury certainly reasonably could have inferred from that 
statement that Davis knew of Seigler’s objective.  Nevertheless, the evidence is 
inadequate to support the additional inference needed to uphold the verdict that Davis 
conspired either explicitly or tacitly with Seigler to possess jointly Seigler’s gun for the 
duration of the car ride.  As in Tyson, there is no evidence that Davis facilitated Seigler’s 
possession of the gun or any other proof showing a unity of purpose or a common goal 
between the two men with respect to possession of the firearm.  The fact that Davis 
provided a car ride to Seigler obviously demonstrates a level of coordinated action but 
that mere transportation is not enough proof from which to infer Davis conspired with 
Seigler to possess his gun.  We reject any contention that a showing that a person is 
   
                                              
9We note that a reasonable argument can be made that Davis’s possession of his own 
weapon undermines the inference that he conspired to possess the remaining two 
weapons.  We, however, do not predicate our result on this observation. 
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driving someone who the driver knows is carrying a gun in itself establishes that there 
was a conspiracy between the driver and the passenger to possess the gun.  See United 
States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 847 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To support a conspiracy 
conviction, the Government must establish, among other elements, that the alleged 
conspirator entered into an agreement and knew that the agreement had the specific 
unlawful purpose charged in the indictment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); cf. Tyson, 653 F.3d at 210 (noting that although Morrell’s decision to provide 
Tyson a ride from the airport evinced some coordinated action it was “too slim a reed 
upon which to hang a criminal conspiracy conviction”).10
As we explained in Tyson, the existence of an agreement is “‘the essence of the 
[conspiracy] offense.’”  653 F.3d at 206 (quoting United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 
147 (3d Cir. 2001)).  “It is, in other words, the sine qua non of the crime itself.”  Tyson, 
653 F.3d at 206.  In this case, a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that there was even a 
tacit conspiracy to possess the firearms could be predicated only on a foundation based 
on the piling of inference upon inference derived from facts that in the aggregate do not 
support those inferences.  We cannot approve such a process.  See United States v. 
  In fact, we note that any 
contention that Davis agreed to provide Seigler a ride to drop off Seigler’s gun and that 
the men thereby agreed that they would together possess the gun on the way to the 
friend’s house is not even logical.   
                                              
10 Though we reject the government’s contention that if Davis knowingly provided a ride 
to Seigler to allow Seigler to drop off his gun that that act in itself demonstrates that 
Davis entered into a conspiracy to possess the firearm, we recognize that the act is 
certainly relevant to the conspiracy charge. 
17 
 
Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 808 (3d Cir. 1987) (“In a [conspiracy] case, the record must be 
scrutinized with great care for such evidence of conspiracy, since conspiracy cannot be 
proven ‘. . . by piling inference upon inference, thus fashioning . . . a dragnet to draw in 
all substantive crimes.’” (quoting Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 224, 94 S.Ct. 
2253, 2262 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted))).   
In conclusion we reiterate that the deferential standard of review that we exercise 
in this case should make us reluctant to disturb the District Court’s order upholding the 
jury’s verdict, and, indeed, it does exactly that.  Nevertheless, the degree of deference of 
our review is tempered by the fact that we must find that there was sufficient evidence to 
allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that Davis was guilty of the crime of which the 
jury convicted him beyond a reasonable doubt.  We conclude that the jury lacked 
sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis entered into a 
conspiracy to possess a stolen firearm or to possess a firearm by a previously-convicted 
felon or, indeed, simply to possess any firearm.  We therefore will reverse the order of 
the District Court denying Davis’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and will reverse the 
judgment of conviction and sentence of June 21, 2011.  We will remand the case to the 
District Court to enter a judgment of acquittal.  
